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rary professionals o r whether they're doctors rhar are doing an 
exchange or academics, ir doesn't marrer. There's a cultural under-
standing and growth that occurs through rhis program and our o ther 
human itarian programs that, in rhe long term, is a huge, huge benefit. 
So rhe individual contacts and mutual understanding that develop are 
as valuable as anyth ing else. 
NK: \X'har role d o you th ink rhc rnilir.uy can pl.ty in \t.mdarJ , for 
d cmin ing rcc.. hno logy? 
LTC C: l rhink rhe roles that we have right now wirh the HDTC 
doing the training rhcy do, plus the OSD SO/LI C [Office of the 
Secrctaty of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity 
Conflict] research and development folks do absolutely tremendous 
work. I wouldn't say it needs to be adjusted. They wi ll go to a coun-
try, look ar a particular situation in terms of terrain, weather, where 
rhe communities are located-any number of facrors-and they'll 
look at ir and say, "You know what might help here is a piece of equip-
ment or some sort of technology rhar could do this." Well whatever ir 
is they chink would work best doesn't exist, so rhey will go manufac-
ture that, and rhc:y'll rake it down to this country and they'll rest it. 
And the Office of the Secretary of Defense fully funds rhar program. 
We've gor equipment down in Ho nduras right now that rhey're doing 
a final rest on. The benefits to rhe partner nation are absolutely 
tremendous, and from a techno logy standpoint, it's those guys who 
work om of OSD SO/LIC a t Fort Belvoir, Vi rginia, that bring a huge 
amount to the table, whether it's experimenting with unmanned aeri-
al vehicles, wirh ground penetrating radar ro idenrif)t m ines-rhose are 
tremendous technological advances that we can capitalize on . 
NK: Wh.n du you rhink is rhe role fil r the mili t.try in m ine ri>k 
.:duc...ll ion .rnd victim assisranc.:? 
LTC C: That's rwo separate questions, so I'd like ro answer each sep-
arately. In mine risk education, our role is ro work wirh rhe commu-
nities and through the community leaders ro help them develop a 
good solid mine risk education program. You know, kids are kids, and 
so often, as you know, children are the victims of land mines; people 
working in rhe agricultural community are rhe victims of land mines. 
Our role is to help the communities in which they live develop srrong 
programs char are coherem, rhar receive rhe necessary funding, thar are 
well enough pur rogether so that they're sustained, thereby reducing 
the number of landmine victims while rhe demincrs go ahead and ger 
an area cleared of mines. 
The other question ... that is a great question , and I was 
talking to the guys from rhe Polus Ccnrer, because in rhe HMA 
Program we really don't have a role in victim assistance. Bur we have 
other programs within Southern Command rhat can assist wirh that. 
We have a humanitarian assistance program. W e have humanitarian 
and civic assistance programs. I would see an example of an organ iza-
tion like rhe Polus Center working in Leon, Nicaragua, where we've 
also worked, primarily after Hurricane Mitch, when Southern 
Command provided both immed iate and long-term disaster rel ief and 
reconsrrucrion ro Central America. In Leon, they have a victim assis-
tance center that need s renovation o r they're trying to build a new o ne. 
We have DoD-funded programs rhar can help with that type of thing, 
and that's rhe type of partnership that I think really goes a long way ro 
rhe mutual benefit of everybody concerned-the United Stares, rhe 
partner nation, the NGOs we partner with, rhe United States m il itary, 
the partner nation military, and rhe ultimate beneficiary being rhe 
mem bers of rhe community that live there. That's where I think we 
can make rhe most money and get the most yardage our of rh is pro-
gram. 
NK : Do you think the mili tilfy i' hertl'J 'u itc:d for m ine acrion rhan 
the h uman itarian s.:cror? 
LTC C: I wouldn't say that at all. I wou ld say there are professionals 
in the humanitarian sector, and 1 would say there are professionals 
in the military. We arc nor at all interested in competing. We're imer-
csrcd in working together to solve mumal problems rhar affecr the 
world community. 
N K: T hat was something you ' pok.: about earlier- partnerships 
and how im porr.rnr they .rre. I "'1.' wondering how you th ink 
rhe mil itary can compkm.:nr other o rg,m it.ttiom worki ng in humani-
t.lria n dcmining. 
LTC C : W hen I was just mentioning the humanitarian assista nce 
program, I rhink rhar's a great example. We've partnered wirh anum-
ber of NGOs throughout the region al ready, both international 
NGOs, the larger ones, as well as local, community-based civic acrion 
groups. Our partnersh ip opportuni ties arc more lim ited by imagina-
tion than they are by fu nd ing. Now, we certainly have some real-world 
concerns; we can't, from a military standpoint, say, "OK, let 's go do 
rhis type of project in this a rea" just because somebod y's asked us ro, 
bur there are many, many cases where there is a confluence of interest, 
and those need ro be pursued vigorously ro make sure rhar we gener-
ate a sort of synergy through the confluence of interest and maximize 
all of our capabilities ro achieve whatever particular objective ir may be 
ar rhe time-whether it's education, whether it's health, whether it's, 
as you mentioned, victim assisrance, rhar's another area rhar parmer-
sh ips are certainly viable. 
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The Role of 
Military Technical Advisors 
Introduction 
In 1989 a multinational contingent of soldiers began to 
arrive in Pakistan tO support a humanitarian mine action program for 
Afghan refugees. They were, in effect, Technical Advisors (TAs) in rhe 
field of humani ta rian mine action, and in rhe years since, military TAs 
have participated in many other programs. This has nor been withom 
irs controversial aspects. 
For rhe purposes of chis discussion (and acknowledging char 
some will not fir rh is description precisely) a military TA is a serving 
soldier who is attached ro a humanitarian mine action program in a 
training, advisory and memoring capacity. The military TA differs 
from visiting military forces in three respects. He or she is nor-or 
should nor be- a short-term visiror, bur rather is in theTA position 
for a period of six months ro one year. The military TA is nor parr of 
a fo rmed military unit, although national contingents within a pro-
gram are usually under rhe command of their senior representative for 
administrative, personnel and disciplinary purposes. Finally, he or she 
is nor armed and may nor necessarily wear a uniform. 
l must confess a certain bias on my part. I have been a mi l-
itary TA and I am immodest enough ro believe rhat my efforrs were 
nor entirely in vain. I have also known and worked with many mili-
tary TAs, from my own country and from others, and while they were 
nor all well-suited ro rhe task, I believe rhar most of them did good 
work. Somewhat inevitably, therefore, I am going to conclude rhar the 
use of military T As is not a bad thing. I have structured rhis discussion 
according to what I perceive ro be the three main concerns: ability, 
money and philosophy. Or, more simply, can they do the job, how 
m uch do they cost and should they be doing it an}'\vay? 
by Rohan Maxwell, M ajor, Canadian Army ----------------------------.1 
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Ability 
Much of the d ebate revolves around rhe ability of military 
T As to train, advise and mentor indigenous personnel in various posi-
tions within rhe organization. These positions can be grouped in to 
three categories: rhe training and supervision required for specific mine 
action tasks, such as finding and destroying mines; the training, logis-
tics, planning, and command and control required fo r daily opera-
tions; and strategic planning, including integration with other devel-
opment activities and resource management. 
With respect to the first category, much has been made of 
the difference berween military-style minefield breaching and rhe exi-
gencies of humanitarian demining. This difference undeniably exists-
in immediate combat. H owever, even in wartime, follow-on activities 
are expected to achieve a high standard, and posr-conflicr clearance is 
expected to reach what is effectively a humanitarian standard. The 
same is true of military demining activities in rhe context of modern 
peace-support operations. It would be disingenuous to suggest that 
milira1y personnel do not possess the techniques to reach rhis standard, 
or the ability to understand and apply rhe International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) . 
Experienced mine action workers have stated that military 
and humanitarian demining d o not differ at the point where the dem-
iner and the ground come together, 1 and that military-style training is 
applicable ro the training of humanitarian deminers. 2 It has also been 
acknowledged that mili tary personnel can successfully form and train 
teams of deminers,3 even though many of these trainers lack "li ve" 
experience4 and even though some countries forbid their personnel 
from conducting actual demining while working as trainers.5 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that military personnel can 
effectively teach specific technical tasks such as d emining and explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques, although they are not ad ept at 
tasks such as mine risk education (MRE), where there is no clear mil-
itary equivalent.6 
Since there is an acknowledged need for qualified and expe-
rienced instructors,? it appears that there is a valid role for suitable mil-
itary T As at this level so long as the tasks coincide with their skills. As 
with any other job, rhe key word is "suirabiliry." Technical skills and 
knowledge are not sufficient: military T As, like civilian T As, must be 
of a high caliber, able to transmit their ski lls and knowledge effective-
ly in a given culrural, environmental and organizational context, and 
remain in place long enough to be of real value.8 Ideally these require-
ments would be incorporated into the selection process used by rhe 
providing country, but there is no guarantee rhar this wi ll be rhe case.9 
Ir has been suggested that the receiving agency should play 
a decisive role in the selection process, IO but this is unlikely to occur 
under the most typical scena rio, where the receiving agency asks for 
assistance and nations respond by sending the military TAs of their 
choice. The militaiy personnel management system of the supplying 
country dominates this process, and it will continue to do so while 
military TAs are seconded to, rather than hi red by, the receiving agen-
cies. T his means that the suitability of an arriving military TA will be, 
to a limited extent, rhe luck of rhe draw. This is defini tely not the pre-
ferred staffing solution; however, my own limited experience working 
with and within international organizations-and more relevantly the 
judgement of those wirh more experience-suggests that rhis problem 
is nor necessarily limited ro the group under discussion. 11 
Military TAs have also achieved success in the second care-
gory, daily operations. One example is given by the Geneva 
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in The 
Role of the Military in Mine Action: " ... military T As provided an 
invaluable injection of expertise at a time when Cambodia was strug-
gling to rebuild its government and economy. Foreign military T As 
appear to have been particularly effective at getting demining teams on 
the ground."i2 T his makes sense, since deploying and sustaining large 
numbers of persons to work on difficult tasks, under demanding con-
ditions, is fundamental to milira1y operations. Given the personnel 
and material resources (however scarce those might be) and specific 
tasks within an assigned area of operations, military T As can perform 
effectively at this level. 
In contrast, most observers appear to believe that the mili-
tary has little if any role in the third category: strategic planning, 
resource management and integration wirh the wider developmental 
effort. T his roo makes sense as sustai nable development is not a core 
military skill, or is nor likely ro become one. As rhe United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) has noted, military personnel can 
assist in this category, up to a point, but in the long rerm, rhe requi-
site training and assistance should be provided by more appropriate j 
agencies.13 That being said, senior officers in most armed forces have 
ro possess strategic planning and resource management skills if they 
are ro carry out their military duties wirh reasonable proficiency. This 
is perhaps most notable in Western military establishments, where the 
language used in many documents and meetings echoes that found in 
civilian organizations, and where M.B.A. studies have assumed a sta-
tus formerly reserved only for 
advanced military training 
courses. 
A 1997 interview 
with the (military) Chief 
Technical Advisor (CTA) of 
the Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) appeared to 
show a sound grasp of mine 
action realities. He discussed 
the need to build a sustain-
able demining program with 
local buy-in, the desirabili ty 
of a long-term approach by 
donors and others, and the 
importance of "weaving 
together the various parts of 
the program" by applying 
business principles. He also 
spoke of capacity building 
and of the requirement for a 
comprehensive national survey and an associated database in order to 
support long-range planning.14 T he ability of military personnel ro 
adapt to the exigencies of mine action does of course depend on the 
individuals concerned , bur the option of using them should not be dis-
missed out of hand. 
Money 
Although some believe that milita1y personnel represent a 
net savings ro rhe receiving organization because their salaries are 
already paid, l5 a more common assessment appears to be that milira1y 
TAs, person for person, are rather more expensive than civilian staff. 
The GICHD's comprehensive study states, " ... the incremental costs 
associated with any foreign dury assignment of personnel from visiting 
milira1y forces may be at least as high as the full cost of engaging equal-
ly well-qualified civilian personnel for the same assignment ."16 If this 
were rrue, then it would clearly be a rational decision on the part of 
the receiving organizations to eschew the use of military TAs. But is it 
rrue? 
The authors of the study cite rwo sources in arriving at this 
conclusion. The first is a paper by rhe Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and D evelopment (OECD), which correctly points our 
that military operations are more expensive than civilian ones: a mili-
tary airlift will cost more rhan a civilian one, a militaiy medical facili-
ty will cost more than a civilian one, and so on. This is undeniable, 
even though the extra cost is not borne by the receiving agency (a 
point that is acknowledged in the paper). 17 As others have nored, iris 
true that "Military unirs cost more for a given operation than the 
equivalent carried out by a civil organization."18 However, we are dis-
cussing individuals, and it is a bit of a stretch to compare something 
like rhc airlift of relief supplies into Somalia with the deployment of 
individual military T As. 
The second source is an American analysis rhar seeks to 
quantify rhe incremental cost of deploying an individual soldier on 
peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) or Kosovo. 
The range given is $200,000 ro $250,000 (U.S.), and it is essentially 
calculated by d ividing the 
total annual cost of each 
force by the number of sol-
diers involved. The incre-
mental cost per so ldier, 
therefore, includes his or her 
share of the operating cosrs 
of everything used by or in 
support of American forces 
stationed in BiH or Kosovo. 
That is, everything from hel-
icopters ro armoured vehi-
cles ro camps to ammuni-
tion ro hospitals, for the 
richest army in the world. 19 
Obviously a military TA, 
operating sans artille ry, 
armored vehicles or arrack 
helicopters will be cheaper. 
The GICHD study takes 
this into account by lopping 
off a third of the incremental cost, thus arriving at a range of $135,000 
to $165,000 per year.20 
This still seems like a he fry sum; as the study no res, ir is "as 
much or more than appropriately qualified, experienced and morivar-
ed civilian personnel would cost (including recruitment and adminis-
trative support costs) if recruited directly."21 It is true thar rhe receiv-
ing agency would bear the entire cost of a civilian TA, while most of 
rhe cost of a military TA would be borne by the supplying nation. This 
might appeal ro a pragmatic mine acrion manager, who might rake the 
view that if there is ro be an incremental cost, ir would be better borne 
by a large government rather than a relatively small mine action pro-
gram. Still, the price seems inordinately high, irrespective of who is 
actually paying. If it really were that high, governments would be bet-
ter advised to conserve their military personnel for other purposes and 
send the money rhus saved ro mine action programs for civilian staff. 
The rrouble is that rhe marh does not work out. T he lower 
end of the proposed range translates to about $12,000 per month in 
incremental costs, and it is difficult to arrive ar that sum without 
reaching levels of generosity not normally associated with the military. 
Salary, medical and dental coverage, insurance, pension contributions 
and so on arc nor incremental costs. Neither are living allowances or 
local operating costs such as vehicles, drivers and interpreters, because 
they would be rhe same for any TA, whether military or civilian. This 
means that the entire incremental cost has to be derived from military 
allowances, administrative support and transpo rtation costs for 
deployment, redeployment and home leave. Even if a T A flies home 
once a month and is an acure administrative challenge, $12 ,000 
equates to an improbably high monthly allowance. Some militaries are 
quire genero us, but even so it would be difficult to arrive at a month-
ly incremental cost in excess of $2,500 or thereabouts. Adding more 
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rhan a bir for luck would give an annual incremental cosr of, say, 
$48,000: hardly enough ro recruit, pay and administer a civilian TA. 
I have belabored rhis point because I believe ir is chimerical. 
T he ofT-repeated assertion rhar military T As are more expensive is 
demonstrably incorrect, no marrer who is paying. One simply can nor 
exrrapolare from rhe per capita incremenral cosr of a fu ll-scale military 
operation, or even per capita incremenral cosr of "borrowing" soldiers 
from visiting military forces, ro rhe incremental cosr of deploying an 
unarmed military TA wirh no logistics, communications or infrastruc-
ture support beyond rhar which would also be provided to a civilian 
TA. While debates over rhe relative quality of military and civilian TAs 
cannot be conclusively settled because borh groups arc comprised of 
individuals whose abilities vary widely, cost is a quantitative issue char 
can be eliminated from the debate altogether. 
Philosophy 
If we accept rhar rhe question of abiliry is ar least sci II open 
and char rhe question of money has been addressed, we are le fr wirh 
philosophical argumenrs. This aspecr of che debare is a relarivcly fa inr 
echo of rhe ongoing concroversy over rhe role of military forces in 
humanitarian operations, and of rhe ofr-cxaggerared "culwral" diff er-
ences between milirary and civilian personnel. A key elemenr of chis 
wider conrroversy-rhe abiliry of milicary personnel ro carry our 
humanitarian rasks- has already been addressed in rhis arricle. 
Anorher concern is related ro security. This argumenr sug-
gests char humanitarian workers may be endangered because bell iger-
enrs won' t be able ro disti ngu ish between military and civilian pe rson-
nel who are engaged in similar work, or because humani tarian workers 
may become cargers by virrue of association with the mil itary. 
However, attacks on humanitarian workers (such as chose char have 
taken place in Afghanistan) are nor carried o ur because of confusion 
over rhe mili rary or civilian statu s of rhe victims, or because of a per-
ceived rainr due ro civil-m ilirary cooperation; rhcy arc carried our 
because rhe arrackers wish ro drive away humanitarian workers. 
The lasr philosophical argumcnr can be summarized as "lr 
isn ' t rheir busi ness," with a subrexr rhar rhe rnilirary is only interested 
in humanitarian mine acrion because rhey are looking for gainful 
employment in orde r ro jusrify rheir existence. In response ro rhe firsr 
point I would suggest thar ir's the business of anyone who can make an 
cfTecrivc conrriburion ro rhe efTorr, and rhar the only " turf ' we should 
be concerned about is rhar concealing rhe mines. As for the second 
po inr, rhe armies char normally provide TAs seem robe busy enough 
these days. Furthermore, in rhe smaller armies, mi litary TAs are drawn 
from a numerically small pool, and chose arm ies are ofren less rhan 
anxious ro send scarce officers and non-commissio ned officers (NCOs) 
ofT ro do work rhac they feel is nor che military's business! 
Conclusion 
Although relarive qualiry is difficult co assess, the average 
abil iry of m ili tary TAs is on par wirh rhe resr of rhe humani tarian mine 
action community and che financial and p hilosophical argumenrs 
against their use do nor srand up ro examination. Military TA~ are a 
useful and usable resource, and since it would be srarding indeed co 
hear a m ine acrion manager complain of a surfeit of resources, I must 
conclude-as promised- char humanitarian m ine actio n benefirs from 
the use of military TAs. 
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Use of 
BELGIAN MILITARY EXPERTS 
For many years, a large debate over the use of military 
experts in humanitarian demining has existed. Some individuals 
are against military demining arguing the military performs dif-
ferent techniques and holds different priorities from humanitari-
an demining. Others are favourable toward military demining, as 
they are the majority of demining centres. The Belgian military 
has been active in demining since World War I (WWI). Still 
today, explosive remnants from WWI and World War II (WWII) 
remain a daily concern in the life of Belgians. The minefields 
have been cleared for many years, yet everyday military experts 
still dispose of UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). It 
is important to understand this process does not take place dur-
ing a military operation. Rather it is placed within the framework 
of helping the population, a type of humanitarian demining. 
Hi1tory 
The explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) service was created immediately after 
WWl. This service was acrive throughout 
Belgium, initially as a decachmenr ro each 
Provincial Recovery Service. In I 922, many 
landmines were disposed of, givi ng th e 
impression ic would only take a few months ro 
complere che project. Unfortunately, it 
became clear rhe UXO problem was far from 
over. In an effort to cackle this issue, rhe 
O rdnance Disposal Service was created on 
October 3, I 923 . 
After WWII , numerous Belgian 
m ilitary unirs were directed ro dispose of the 
obstacles and m ines la id in both world wars. 
T hese unirs were sent rhroughour Belgium. 
On August 16, 1941 , rhe EOD service was 
recreated, afrer rhe captive pe rsonnel were 
freed , ro dispose of all explosive devices and 
preserve any d evices of military importance. 
Bomb d isposal reams quickly formed in rowns 
char suff e red from bombing during the wars 
and in places where old minefields, ammuni-
tion dumps or explosive charges were discov-
ered. The EOD service activities conrinually 
exceeded rhe casks emrusred ro ir by staying in 
constant conracr with several resistance groups 
and wirh allies. Through this constant interac-
tion, EOD was able to inform London of p os-
sible manufacturing errors in fusing sysccms 
and of likely causes of non-exploding bombs. 
The bo mb disposal experts also recovered 
explosives of defused devices and passed on 
rhe remaining explosive fille rs to resistance 
groups for sabotage purposes. 
On Ocrober 16, 1944, the 
Explosive O rdnance and Obscacle Disposal 
Service was creared as an official addicion ro 
rhe EOD service and Belgian Armed Forces. 
In the first year, 300 men worked under chis 
by Captain Vincent Muylkens, Belgian 
Defense Staff Operations & Training EOD 
in EOD 
servtcc. The Explosive Ordnance D isposal 
Service was created on December I , 1945, ro 
unite a ll exisring bomb disposal un its under 
one single command. 
Between 1944 and 1948, rhe EOD 
service srrucrure changed constantly as 
Belgium search for an ideal organ ization and 
due ro rhc Bomb Disposal Unir consran rly 
decreasing inside. Likewise, afrer WWll, rhe 
authorities believed an EOD service was no 
longer necessary. The abolition of rhis service 
was again imminenr. However, on July 4, 
I947, a d ifferent decision was made-ro 
reduce irs srrengrh ro 42 men. Fortunately chis 
decision was never broughr ro execution , and 
by rhe end of 1948, rhe EOD service consist-
ed of 350 men. T he Explosive Ordnance and 
Obsracle Disposal Service held a temporary 
unir sraw s unril May I, 1948, when ic became 
an organization of the basic Armed Forces. 
Between I 949 and I 955, rhe EOD service saw 
many changes, essenrially as a resulc of che 
reorgani7.-ati on of rhe Armed Forces. Ar the 
end of 1955, rhe EOD service had decreased 
ro 11 5 personnel. 
In O cto ber 1971 , the army dete r-
mined rhe EOD service would no longer be an 
independent unit. However, the early 1970s 
consisted of inrernacional terrorism, which 
meanr a need for Belgian specialists capable of 
d isposing booby traps, letter bombs, car 
bombs, etc. Furthermore, rhe number of left-
over munirions from the two world wars 
exceed ed the previous estimates. Each year, 
che EOD service received 3,000-4,000 
requests ro dispose of devices of all kinds. Less 
rhan three years after its dissolution rhe EOD 
service was again creared on August I, 1974. 
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